Beschreibung:

Eight: Lieutenant-Commander L. H. Moorhouse, who was Mentioned in Despatches for service with Combined Operations Pilotage Party ‘Inhuman’ during the invasion of North Africa, 1942. British War and Victory Medals (Mid. L.H. Moorhouse, R.N.R.); 1939-45 Star; Atlantic Star; Africa Star, clasp, North Africa 1942-43; Defence and War Medals 1939-45, M.I.D. oak leaf; Royal Naval Reserve Decoration G.VI.R., 1st issue, silver and silver-gilt, the reverse officially dated ‘1944’, nearly extremely fine (8) £500-600 Footnote M.I.D. London Gazette 13 April 1943: “For bravery and skill… in operations in North African Waters” R.N.R. London Gazette 6 October 1944. Leslie Hugh ‘Gaffer’ Moorhouse was born at Urmston, Manchester on 3 October 1900. He was educated at Manchester Grammar School (1911-1915), followed by 18 months as a Cadet at the school ship H.M.S. Conway. He was appointed Temporary Midshipman in the Royal Naval Reserve in April 1917, and appointed to the cruiser H.M.S. Minotaur the following month. In Minotaur, and later the Armed Merchant Cruiser H.M.S. Kildonan Castle, he saw active service on the ‘Northern Patrol’. He was demobilised in May 1919 and commenced a career as an officer of the Merchant Navy, qualifying as Second Mate in 1921, First Mate in 1923 and Master in 1927. Throughout the nineteen-twenties he was at sea in ships of the Manchester Liners company. He rejoined the R.N.R. in 1927 and served until 1932, when he went onto the Retired List as a Lieutenant. In a change of career, he then became an actor. Recalled at the outbreak of war in 1939, Moorhouse served successively in H.M.Ships Pyramus, Caroline, St. Zeno and Snowdrop until appointed to H.M.S. President “for miscellaneous services” in January 1942. Later that year he is shown serving under Combined Operations “Intelligence Plans (Naval), Intelligence Section”. Combined Operations Pilotage Parties were the brainchild of Lt. Cdr. H.N. Clogstoun-Willmott, R.N. As early as 1941, when appointed navigating officer of Force X for the proposed capture of Rhodes, Willmott had realised the importance of thorough reconnaissance ahead of amphibious landings and the limits of what could be learned from aerial photography, or even from submarine periscope observations. Such could not reveal the natural hazards of submerged shoals and rocks, and unknown tides and currents, nor comprehensively document the nature and location of man-made obstacles and defences. The presence of hidden sandbars close to the beaches, for example, could lead troops to prematurely disembark into deep water, and the composition of the beaches themselves may not be suitable for the discharge of heavy vehicles that would need to cross them. He also became aware of the inadequacy of existing charts for the requirements of successful assault pilotage. Willmott’s solution was to personally undertake clandestine survey of the beaches and their approaches. Although the assault itself did not go ahead, a seed had been planted, and Willmott circulated his theories and findings in a number of reports, though with disappointing results. The disinterest of higher authority changed with the bitter lessons of the Dieppe raid of August 1942, when troops and tanks were landed on narrow, pebble beaches, commanded by lofty cliffs, and blocked by a seawall and concrete obstacles, reconnaissance being limited largely to examination of pre-war postcards. With landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) scheduled for November, and rapidly approaching, Willmott was remarkably suddenly ordered to collect, train, organise and equip a team of navigators and others for reconnaissance and pilotage work. The result was two groups collectively codenamed Party Koodoo-Inhuman: the Koodoo element being responsible for pre-invasion reconnaissance, and Inhuman undertaking approach marking and pilotage. Personnel were a mixture drawn from the Royal Navy and soldiers of the S.B.S. and seems to have amounted to around 20 officers and