Beschreibung:

GRANT, ULYSSES S. Lt., General, President. Autograph letter signed ("U.S. Grant") as General-in-Chief of the Armies, to Major General Henry Halleck in Washington, D.C.; "Head Quarters, Armies of the United States," Quarles Mill, Virginia, 26 May 1864. 4 1/2 pages, 4to, with a 1/2 page postscript (initialled "U.S.G."), last page with recipient's lengthy docket . "LEE'S ARMY IS REALLY WHIPPED": ON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR, GRANT SPELLS OUT HIS STRATEGY AND SENSES VICTORY A remarkable battlefield report from Grant -- appointed supreme commander of the Armies in March -- to Halleck, his former commander (since March reduced to Chief of Staff). The letter dates from the eventful early weeks of the Union's crucial spring 1864 offensive. Grant and the reorganized Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan early in May and battled Lee's army in a quick string of bloody engagements: the Wilderness (May 5-6), Spotsylvania (May 7-20, along the North Anna River (May 23-27) and the Totopotomoy Creek (May 26-30). In spite of heavy losses and strong Confederate resistance, Grant's forces moved inexorably southwards on a zigzag course. First, Grant reports the relative positions of the opposing armies: "...Lee's right rests on a swamp East of Richmond & Fredericksburg road and South of N. Anna [River], his center on the river at Ox Ford and his left on Little River with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. [Winfield Scott] Hancock with his Corps and one division of the 9th Corps, crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right wing of Lee's Army. One division of the 9th Corps is on the North bank of the Anna, at Ox Ford...so that it could reinforce either wing of our Armny with equal facility...." "To make a direct attack form either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success could not justify. To turn the enemy by his right...is impossible on account of the swamp...To turn him by his left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of an Army [which would] have to be crossed. I have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at, or near Hanover Town. This crosses all these streams at once....During the night last night the trains and Artillery...belonging to the right wing, and one Division of that wing, was quietly withdrawn...and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this Divison, with most of the Cavalry, will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossing. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour and follow as rapidly as possible...." [These moves resulted in the engagements known collectively as Totopotomoy Creek.] "Lee's Army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the actions of his Army shows it unmistakeably. A battle with them, outside of intrenchments, can not be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken but I feel that our success over Lee's Army is already insured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men and to break down that of the enemy...." Grant reports that the army is cutting the rail lines: "I want to leave a gap in the roads North of Richmond so big that, to get a single track, they will have to import rails...", and in a postscript he asks that the preparations be made to move his supply base from Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, south to the White House, on the Pamunkey River. The present letter is one of Grant's longest handwritten letters of war date. As the costly drawn-out campaign to follow proved, Grant had grossly underestimated the Army of Northern Virginia, which fought tenaciousy for another 11 months before it was forced to capitulate.