Beschreibung:

Sold by order of the recipient The fine and impressive ‘UK Mainland Operations’ G.M. group of seven awarded to Warrant Officer Class II Mark Anthony Doyle, Tidworth Troop, 721 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron, Royal Logistic Corps, who having previously served operationally in numerous countries was at the time of his award one of a small specialised team responsible for E.O.D. assistance in the South West of England when he was called upon to deal with a serious incident involving the highly sensitive military explosive HMX at the Royal Ordnance Explosive Factory, Bridgwater, Somerset on 4 July 2002 – this difficult operation during which his life was in constant danger took over 30 hours to perform George Medal, E.II.R., 2nd issue (24817596 S/Sgt M. A. Doyle RLC); General Service 1962, 1 clasp, Northern Ireland (24817596 L Cpl M A Brine, RAPC); NATO Medal, clasp, Former Yugoslavia; Operational Service Medal, clasp, Afghanistan (24817596 S Sgt M A Doyle GM RLC); NATO Medal, clasp, ISAF; Jubilee 2002; Regular Army L.S. & G.C, E.II.R. (24817596 S Sgt M A Doyle, RLC) mounted court style as worn, extremely fine (7) £6000-8000 Footnote Note: The recipient changed his surname from Brine to Doyle in 1993 for family reasons. G.M. London Gazette 26 April 2003. The recommendation states: ‘Staff Sergeant Doyle is an Ammunition Technician serving with Tidworth Troop, 11 E.O.D. Regiment R.L.C. He is a member of a small team responsible for the provision of Explosive Ordnance Disposal assistance to the civil police and other agencies in the South West of England. On 4 July 2002, Staff Sergeant Doyle was tasked by the Joint Service E.O.D. Operations Centre to the scene of an explosion at the Royal Ordnance Explosive Factory at Bridgwater. On arrival Staff Sergeant Doyle ascertained that an explosion had occurred in an area of the plant concerned with the neutralisation of the highly sensitive military explosive HMX. The explosion had resulted in significant injury to a Royal Ordnance employee. The area immediately around the decontamination facility was covered with concentrated caustic soda, the facility was badly damaged and a number of pipes, which were over four metres long, were lodged in areas of the plant that were difficult to access. To further complicate matters, the exact cause of the explosion could not be determined. It is likely that a highly sensitive type of explosive, prone to spontaneous decomposition had been produced inadvertently during the manufacturing process. The explosive within the pipes was becoming progressively more sensitive as it dried out. Staff Sergeant Doyle’s priority was to reduce the hazard to personnel and prevent a further explosion within the site. He was not able to destroy the pipes in situ due to their close proximity to other hazardous items, these included a bulk ammonia store and a very large concentrated acid plant. He made innovative use of remote handling equipment, but due to the position of most of the pipes, he still had to move forward and expose himself to a considerable hazard. Had one of the other pipes exploded whilst he had been in its proximity, he would at best sustained very serious injury, or, more likely, have been killed. This hazard was only partially mitigated by the presence of a paramedic trauma unit on site during the operation. In a difficult operation that lasted over 30 hours Staff Sergeant Doyle used water to reduce the hazard posed by the explosive contained within the pipes, before moving them by hand to a location where they could finally be rendered safe through the remote controlled initiation of incendiary devices. During the course of this final action, the contents of a further two pipes exploded. It is a testament to the professionalism and bravery of Staff Sergeant Doyle that no further injuries or damage to the plant occurred in this incident. It is considered that Staff Sergeant Doyle’s actions on this operational task, which presented a considerable r