EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Collection of six typed letters signed (“Ike,” “DDE,” or “DE”), as former President, to Sir Kenneth Strong (1900-1982). Together 17 pages, 4to, personal stationery. Some pencil underscoring and marginal ticks, presumably by recipient. [With:] EISENHOWER. Autograph manuscript, unsigned, n.d. 2 pages, 4to. On Cuban Missile crisis.
EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Collection of six typed letters signed (“Ike,” “DDE,” or “DE”), as former President, to Sir Kenneth Strong (1900-1982). Together 17 pages, 4to, personal stationery. Some pencil underscoring and marginal ticks, presumably by recipient. [With:] EISENHOWER. Autograph manuscript, unsigned, n.d. 2 pages, 4to. On Cuban Missile crisis. “QUIT YOUR WORRYING IKE; I’LL HANDLE UNCLE JOE.” FDR TO EISENHOWER A fascinating collection of letters as Ike revisits several key episodes of World War II with the former SHAEF intelligence officer, in connection with Strong’s book on intelligence gathering in war and peace, Intelligence at the Top (a copy of which is included with the lot). In a lengthy 4 May 1967 letter, he takes exception to Strong’s characterization of “Montgomery’s plan of drawing the enemy units away from the American front” in Normandy in 1944. It was not drawn up that way, Ike points out. “You were not in London to attend the briefings…before the invasion began” in which Monty “planned to get Caen on the first rush…The revision of the ‘plan’ was a necessary and useful improvisation, brought about by the reaction of the enemy…It shows that wars cannot be fought as set pieces, along strict and pre-arranged lines.” He dismisses as “somewhat fantastic” Montgomery’s notion of September 1944 about “dashing immediately for Berlin.” On wartime US-Soviet relations (about which Ike reveals much skepticism and mistrust) he recalls FDR saying to him twice, in December 1943 of Stalin, “Quit your worrying Ike; I’ll handle Uncle Joe.” 8 September 1967: “I remember well that you advised that [Dresden] … was not a profitable target, but…Spaatz or one of the other airmen maintained that the Russians thought it was a very remunerative target and should be attacked.” At one point (17 November 1967) he turns the table and asks Strong for historical clarification about “the exact date and hour that word of the German attack in the Ardennes reached me at SHAEF.” Ike remembered it as noontime. Bradley thought it was dinnertime. Other letters touch on postwar events and mention Nixon, John Foster Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, Harold Macmillan, JFK and the Cuban missile crisis. The archive includes a fascinating and tantalizing set of hand-written notes regarding the 1962 crisis: “I was there from 15th – 25th…Scientist discovered them first from general reports. Result accelerated since weekend 13-15th. Special govt executive panel dealt with problem,” [then lists the members of the Ex Comm]…Bundy leading spirit…” A rich and important historical archive.
EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Collection of six typed letters signed (“Ike,” “DDE,” or “DE”), as former President, to Sir Kenneth Strong (1900-1982). Together 17 pages, 4to, personal stationery. Some pencil underscoring and marginal ticks, presumably by recipient. [With:] EISENHOWER. Autograph manuscript, unsigned, n.d. 2 pages, 4to. On Cuban Missile crisis.
EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Collection of six typed letters signed (“Ike,” “DDE,” or “DE”), as former President, to Sir Kenneth Strong (1900-1982). Together 17 pages, 4to, personal stationery. Some pencil underscoring and marginal ticks, presumably by recipient. [With:] EISENHOWER. Autograph manuscript, unsigned, n.d. 2 pages, 4to. On Cuban Missile crisis. “QUIT YOUR WORRYING IKE; I’LL HANDLE UNCLE JOE.” FDR TO EISENHOWER A fascinating collection of letters as Ike revisits several key episodes of World War II with the former SHAEF intelligence officer, in connection with Strong’s book on intelligence gathering in war and peace, Intelligence at the Top (a copy of which is included with the lot). In a lengthy 4 May 1967 letter, he takes exception to Strong’s characterization of “Montgomery’s plan of drawing the enemy units away from the American front” in Normandy in 1944. It was not drawn up that way, Ike points out. “You were not in London to attend the briefings…before the invasion began” in which Monty “planned to get Caen on the first rush…The revision of the ‘plan’ was a necessary and useful improvisation, brought about by the reaction of the enemy…It shows that wars cannot be fought as set pieces, along strict and pre-arranged lines.” He dismisses as “somewhat fantastic” Montgomery’s notion of September 1944 about “dashing immediately for Berlin.” On wartime US-Soviet relations (about which Ike reveals much skepticism and mistrust) he recalls FDR saying to him twice, in December 1943 of Stalin, “Quit your worrying Ike; I’ll handle Uncle Joe.” 8 September 1967: “I remember well that you advised that [Dresden] … was not a profitable target, but…Spaatz or one of the other airmen maintained that the Russians thought it was a very remunerative target and should be attacked.” At one point (17 November 1967) he turns the table and asks Strong for historical clarification about “the exact date and hour that word of the German attack in the Ardennes reached me at SHAEF.” Ike remembered it as noontime. Bradley thought it was dinnertime. Other letters touch on postwar events and mention Nixon, John Foster Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, Harold Macmillan, JFK and the Cuban missile crisis. The archive includes a fascinating and tantalizing set of hand-written notes regarding the 1962 crisis: “I was there from 15th – 25th…Scientist discovered them first from general reports. Result accelerated since weekend 13-15th. Special govt executive panel dealt with problem,” [then lists the members of the Ex Comm]…Bundy leading spirit…” A rich and important historical archive.
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